Planned investments by Federal, state, and local governments in high-speed rail in Virginia could expose another split in the Hampton Roads region, revealing differences between Peninsula vs. South-of-the-James-River interests.
Right now, Norfolk has ended up being at the edge of "Metropolis." From a road-based perspective, Norfolk is where Interstate 64 ends. The city is not in the vibrant middle of a road network, where it could get business and visitors from north and south/east and west. Swamps to the south and the Atlantic Ocean to the east isolate Norfolk. One sign of the isolation: Norfolk is the largest metropolitan community in the United States without any professional major league sports team.
Even from the beginning of colonial development, Norfolk was bypassed. The settlers who built Jamestown in 1607 moved upstream, away from the threat of Spanish raiders. However, the high-quality natural harbor had stimulated some town development by 1775. At the start of 1776, however, British sailors under Lord Dunmore and the rebellious Virginians both participated in the destruction of Norfolk. It was rebuilt after the American Revolution, survived the Civil War, then benefitted greatly when larger steamships after the Civil War required deeper channels.
Until the Civil War, Petersburg and Richmond conspired to block the linkage of the Norfolk port to the rail lines that led west of the Fall Line. Richmond and Petersburg recognized that shipping companies wanted to maximize the number of loads that ships could carry between coastal ports, rather than spend precious days sailing up and down inland rivers to reach the port. Sailing up the James River created a costly delay compared to sailing directly from Norfolk, so Richmond/Petersburg feared that ship owners would prefer to use the Virginia port right on the Atlantic coastline - Norfolk.
In addition, as shipping companies built larger and larger ships, they required deeper and deeper channels to avoid running aground. That's why, before the Civil War, Richmond built a rail line to West Point (at the confluence of the Pamunkey and Mattaponi rivers, and thus at the headwaters of the York River) where the river channel was deeper, in hopes of maintaining control over the rail-to-ship transfer business.
What would happen once rail cars could travel directly from the Appalachian Plateau/Shenandoah Valley/Piedmont carrying coal, wheat, and tobacco to Norfolk, bypassing the Fall Line ports? Norfolk would grow, while Richmond/Petersburg would stagnate. (Turns out Newport News would also grow, when a rail line went down the Peninsula to that deepwater port (leaving West Point as a dead end.)
Norfolk was finally able to connect its rail lines to the interior. As a result, Alexandria, Petersburg, and Richmond declined as port cities between 1865 and 1900, while Norfolk, Portsmouth, and Newport News (with 45' deep channels) benefitted from new rail connections to the docks at their ports. The C&O Raiload built its coal export facility at Newport News, while the Norfolk and Western Railroad built its coal export docks at Lamberts Point in Norfolk in the 1880's.
Prior to the Civil War, railroads were designed to connect the interior to the Fall Line port cities. Virginia and other Southern states built their railroad lines to steer trade from the "backcountry" or "hinterland" to a favored port. The Orange and Alexandria Railroad connected Alexandria to the the farms in the upper Rappahannock River watershed in the Piedmont, while the Manassas Gap Railroad was built through the Blue Ridge and connected Alexandria to the Shenandoah Valley. The Central Virginia Railroad connected Richmond to the farms located along the upper reaches of the North Anna and South Anna rivers, plus some of the Rivanna River watershed in the Piedmont.
The Richmond and Danville Railroad drew trade from as far away as Halifax and Pittsylvania counties, on the North Carolina border, to Richmond. The South Side Railroad connected Petersburg to the farms in the Appomattox River watershed, and farms along tributaries on the south bank of the James River.
Port cities and coastal states competed for rail/port traffic. Petersburg and Portsmouth sought to control trade from eastern North Carolina. Rather than cooperate and build a network of lines that would benefit both ports, each tried to exclude the other from connecting to boats that travelled down the Roanoke River to the Fall Line at Weldon and Roanoke Rapids, North Carolina.
Further inland, North Carolina blocked development of a direct rail connection from its upper Piedmont to Virginia. North Carolina financed a railroad from its western Piedmont to its Atlantic Coast ports, expecting economic benefits from traffic. This was an early version of the modern "smart growth" strategy, to leverage investments in transportation infrastructure to stimulate economic growth that creates tax revenues that repay tthe costs of the transportation project.
North Carolina then refused to allow any railroad company to connect from the state rail line at Greensboro, NC to the Virginia rail system at Danville, VA. North Carolina officials feared the economic impacts of a rail connection to Danville, which was already connected to Richmond and Petersburg. North Carolina farmers would ship their crops, and import their manufactured items, through Chesapeake Bay ports. This would reduce business at the North Carolina ports of Wilmington and Morehead City, and the state investment in the rail connections to North Carolina ports would be wasted.
To the dismay of North Carolina politicians, the Confederate Government built the Piedmont Railroad between Greensboro and Danville during the Civil War. The line was built over vehement objections of states rights advocates in the Confederate Congress. The "national" government of the Confederacy under President Jefferson Davis mandated the new rail connection as a military necessity. The Confederate government saw the railroad connection as a war measure more important that states rights, since the Confederate Army needed food and material from the Deep South states. By 1862, after the Yankee blockade and capture of coastal ports such as Norfolk, the Confederate government needed interior lines of communication to supply the troops on the front line in Virginia.
Today, Virginia politicians are aware of the potential economic impacts associated with construction of new railroad capacity. To overcome its isolation, Norfolk is fighting to be connected to a high-speed rail network being planned by the Federal and state governments. Whether high-speed rail is designed for passengers to relieve pressure on the airports, or even for freight to reduce the truck traffic congesting the Interstates, Norfolk want to be sure it's not bypassed by an inland rail route again.
The James River greatly complicates the plans of Norfolk, however. A quick glimpse at the map shows a rail line down the Peninsula already connects Hampton and Newport News to Richmond and points north. That's rail line was built by the C&O, which has been absorbed by the CSX Railroad. The interstate highways were routed the same way, and tunnels/bridges connected I-64 on the Peninsula to Norfolk, Virginia Beach, and other communities of south Hampton Roads.
However, there's no easy way to get a railroad across the water barrier of the James River. Unlike automobiles, high-speed trains can't climb overpasses or dip into steeply-slanting tunnels. Railroad locomotives require flat grades, and that's why there is no railroad bridge crossing the James River downstream of Richmond today.
Building a new railroad bridge or tunnel to carry high-speed trains from the Peninsula across the James River to "Southern Hampton Roads" would require a dramatic engineering breakthrough, if it's to be achieved at a reasonable cost, or a massive investment in purchase of new right-of-way and construction. realistically, extension of a rail line from the Peninsula to Norfolk is unrealistic.
However, Norfolk has a different option for obtaining high-speed rail. An existing Norfolk Southern line paralleling US 460 could be upgraded, going south to Petersburg and then east to Norfolk/Virginia Beach. In that scenario, the Peninsula would retain its existing regular-speed rail line, but Williamsburg/Newport News/Hampton would be bypassed by the high-speed rail upgrades.
Compared to building a rail bridge/tunnel over the James River, construction costs for upgrading the rail line south of the James River (parallel to US 460) would be minimized. One major drawback: the population south of the James from the Fall Line eastward is sparse until reaching Suffolk. The trains would service very few customers between Petersburg and Sufolk. In contrast, a high-speed rail line on the Peninsula would serve customers along a much higher percentage of the proposed route.
If money were no object, the Federal/state/local governments might build both routes - but funding is constrained. Because money is limited, Hampton Roads will have to choose one high-speed rail route that benefits a portion of the region far more substantially than the rest. Either Newport News, or Norfolk, might become a high-speed rail destination... but not both. If the region can't choose and lobby hard for one route, then Federal funding for high-speed rail will probably gpo to other places in the United states, such as the Los Angeles-Las wegas route, and both Norfolk and Newport News will continue to rely upon regular-speed rail service.
(Why isn't Virginia Beach considered a destination? That city no longer has rail service between Norfolk and the resort area on the Atlantic Coast shoreline. The old rail line has been abandoned. The city of Virginia Beach has purchased the route, and plans to use it for an extension of the Norfolk light rail system known as the Tide.)
