Race to the Dan: The Southern Strategy

after victory at Cowpens on January 17, 1781, General  Nathanael Greene outraced General Charles Cornwallis to safety on the north side of the Dan River
after victory at Cowpens on January 17, 1781, General Nathanael Greene outraced General Charles Cornwallis to safety on the north side of the Dan River
Source: A School History of the United States, from the discovery of America to the year 1880, Scene of Operations in the South (by David B. Scott)

After the French declared war in 1777, the British had to reallocate troops and ships across the world. In addition to defending Great Britain from invasion or attack, the British military needed to protect assets in India, Africa, Gibraltar, and the sugar islands in the Caribbean. The prospect of regaining control of the northern colonies was recognized as unrealistic after the Battle of Saratoga; there were too many rebelling patriots and not enough loyalists there.

General Henry Clinton was trapped in New York by George Washington's Continental Army and would not receive enough new troops to break out. In London, Lord George Germain adopted a "southern strategy" and chose to focus on regaining royal control in Georgia, South Carolina, and North Carolina. Those colonies provided valuable markets for British goods and for the slave trade. They also supplied rice and indigo. A future peace treaty might prioritize retention of the southern colonies, while permitting the northern colonies a greater degree of freedom or even independence.

The British capture of Savannah on December 29, 1778 was the first success. The royal governor, James Wright, returned in July 1779. Many residents chose to sign a pledge of loyalty to ing George III and Georgia became the only colony to have royal rule restored.

A combined siege by a French fleet and "American" troops in September/October 1779 failed to recapture the port city. A Polish count, Casimir Pulaski, died in that siege; a Virginia county formed in 1839 was named after him.

George Washington's spy network in New York alerted him that General Henry Clinton planned to send a force south from New York City to capture Charles Town, South Carolina. The Continental Army in the south was based there, commanded by General Benjamin Lincoln. In December 1779 Washington sent all 2,500 men in the Virginia Continental line regiments south to reinforce Lincoln.

Because the Royal Navy controlled the Atlantic Ocean, General William Woodford had to lead those troops on an 800-mile march from their encampments around New York in the middle of winter. By the time they reached Petersburg in March 1780, some enlistments had expired and others were too sick to keep marching.

To get to Charles Town before the British, Woodford had the men drop much of their baggage at Petersburg. From their the soldiers walked an average of 20 miles/day for a month. By the time the Virginia reinforcements reached Charles Town, there were 750 more soldiers remaining to join General Lincoln's Continental Army. They managed to get into the city before the British gained control of the Cooper River and blocked further reinforcement.1

The British led by General Henry Clinton captured Charles Town, South Carolina. Most of the Continental Army in the southern colonies, including the remains of the Virginia regiments organized as the 1st Detachment and 2nd Detachment, became prisoners of war on May 12, 1780.

Clinton returned to New York and left General Charles Cornwallis the responsibility of gaining control over the rural Carolina backcountry. A high percentage of those Continental Army prisoners died over the next two years while on prison ships anchored in the Charles Town harbor.

When General Benjamin Lincoln surrendered, an additional 380 men in the 3rd Virginia Detachment had been marching towards Charles Town to reinforce the Continental Army forces. Those troops, commanded by Colonel Abraham Buford, were the first target of Cornwallis.

Buford tried to flee north but marched too slowly; Colonel Banastre Tarleton caught the 3rd Virginia Detachment at Waxhaws on May 29, 1780. According to the Virginians, Tarleton's men massacred many of those who tried to surrender.

Colonel Charles Porterfield had been leading another group of Virginia state troops to join with Buford. They had resisted marching outside the boundaries of Virginia but agreed to follow him to South Carolina. Those troops were a day away from joining up with the 3rd Virginia Detachment when the Battle of Waxhaws occurred on May 29, 1780.

After Waxhaws, the only surviving large detachment of Virginia troops outside the state was the 9th Virginia Regiment at Fort Pitt. By 1780, that regiment consisted of just two companies. For the moment, Pennsylvania and Virginia had suspended their dispute regarding which colony would control the Forks of the Ohio and issue land grants there.2

Military victory by Colonel Tarleton over Colonel Buford did not translate into a political realignment in South Carolina with loyalists regaining control. Instead, reports of the Waxhaws massacre stimulated strong anti-British sentiment. More men joined partisan groups; loyalists were suppressed even more intensely in the brutal backcountry civil war. The British army was able to establish royal authority over whatever territory the troops occupied in South Carolina, but loyalists were unable to retain control as soon as those troops left.

After the surrender at Charles Town, the Continental Congress appointed General Horatio Gates as head of the Southern Department of the Continental Army to replace imprisoned General Lincoln. General Gates commanded a force of 3,000 new troops who marched south. He had some Continental Army units from Maryland and Delaware, but primarily militia from Virginia and North Carolina. Charles Porterfield and his Virginians was able to unite with those troops, as was General Edward Stevens with 700 raw Virginia militia.

General Cornwallis did not stay bottled up in Charles Town. He had sufficient military power to go anywhere he wished, unlike General Clinton in New York City, and chose to be aggressive. After Tarleton's success, he marched west to defeat the army led by Horatio Gates.

The smaller army of British Regulars collided with General Gates's force on August 16, 1780. Gates had assembled a larger number of men, but they were poorly trained in comparison to the British Regulars. Gates was trying to reach a strong defensive position he had identified at Sanders Creek when the British attacked and won a decisive victory.

The Virginia militia on the left flank panicked at the sight of the approaching bayonets and fled the battlefield. In his report later to Governor Thomas Jefferson, General Edward Stevens wrote:3

it was out of the power of Man to rally them.

In the battle at Camden, Cornwallis eliminated organized Continental Army resistance in South Carolina for the moment. Colonel Porterfield was mortally wounded. General Horatio Gates fled the battlefield and rode 200 miles in three days to reach Charlotte and then Hillsborough, North Carolina. While he may have been seeking the North Carolina legislature's support to recruit a new army, his abandonment of the battlefield was perceived as cowardice. The Continental Congress recalled him and sent General Nathanael Greene to lead the Southern Department of the Continental Army.4

After Camden, British Major Patrick Ferguson led loyalists organized under his command to the Blue Ridge. He issued proclamations encouraging the colonists in western North Carolina to join him. He paroled prisoners to transmit his promises of lenient treatment and protection of families a "velvet-glove approach to reconciliation."

Those promises were undercut by the previous brutality of the civil war in the Carolinas between loyalists and patriots, plus stories about the recent massacre of surrendering prisoners at Waxhaws. Refugees still fled across the mountains to the settlements on the Watauga River from places near Charlotte, which was later described as a "hornet's nest" of resistance to the British.

The historical record is thin that Ferguson issued an often-repeated warning, but the men living west of the Blue Ridge (the "Overmountain Men") organized in response as if the warning had been issued by Ferguson:5

That if they did not desist from their opposition to British arms he would march his army over the mountains, hang their leaders, and lay their country to waste with fire and sword.

On September 23, 1780, 200 members of the Virginia militia led by Colonel William Campbell mustered together in Abingdon. They marched south the next day, joining other Overmountain Men to cross the Blue Ridge and fight the loyalist force of Major Ferguson. On October 7, the Americans completely overwhelmed Ferguson and his loyalist militia in a battle at Kings Mountain. The destruction of the left wing of Cornwallis's army was the first to disrupt the southern strategy of the British.6

the Overmountain Men started marching towards Kings Mountain after mustering in Abingdon, so the modern Overmountain Trail starts there
the Overmountain Men started marching towards Kings Mountain after mustering in Abingdon, so the modern Overmountain Trail starts there
Source: National Park Service, Southern Campaign of the American Revolution Parks in South Carolina

Southwest Virginians mustered at Abingdon in September, 1780 and marched across the Blue Ridge as part of the Overmountain Men
Southwest Virginians mustered at Abingdon in September, 1780 and marched across the Blue Ridge as part of the Overmountain Men
Source: National Park Service, Abingdon Muster Grounds

The new Continental Army commander in the south, General Nathanael Greene, inherited a small army of initially just 1,500 man after the disaster at Camden. Following the battle at Kings Mountain, Greene chose to divide his force. He hoped that Cornwallis would chase after different pieces, enabling him to isolate a segment of the more-powerful British army and win another victory.

Cornwallis was not receiving reinforcements from New York, Great Britain, or the Caribbean. Few loyalists were joining after Kings Mountain, while Greene was getting reinforcements from Virginia. It was less important for Greene to win battles than it was for him to keep fighting. Every British Regular who was killed, wounded, or captured in fights with Greene would drain Cornwallis's capacity to implement the southern strategy and restore royal authority. Each battle drained Cornwallis' army without destroying the ability of the rebelling Americans to maneuver in the Carolinas.

Partisan forces led by Thomas Sumter, Francis Marion, and "Light Horse Harry" Henry Lee ranged across South Carolina. They prevented the loyalists from re-establishing control sufficient to bring back the royal governor, as had occurred in Georgia.

Greene's strategy worked. Cornwallis sent Colonel Banastre Tarleton and his loyalist soldiers in the British Legion after a wing of Greene's army commanded by General Daniel Morgan. In a battle at Cowpens on January 17, 1781, Morgan skillfully arranged militia from Virginia, South Carolina, and North Carolina in front of better-trained Continental Army troops. The British soldiers reacted to the quick retreat of the militia and, thinking the battle won, advanced too far and ended up being enveloped.

The British lost about 1,000 soldiers. After his major victory, Morgan quickly retreated away from Cornwallis' other troops. The 600 British prisoners were marched north to Winchester, Virginia.7

Even after defeats at Kings Mountain and Cowpens, Cornwallis still had the most powerful army in South Carolina. He lacked the number of loyalists and British Regulars required to occupy the colony and protect the loyalists, but he had the capacity to engage and destroy General Nathanael Greene's army. Cornwallis left his base at Winnsboro, South Carolina and sought to catch Morgan and reclaim the British prisoners.

Greene wisely chose to run fast rather than fight. He skillfully escaped being trapped as he retreated north in a race for the best defensive barrier available, the Dan River.

In early February 1781, Cornwallis thought he was in position to block Greene from crossing the Dan River. The British and their Hessian allies were at what is now Winston-Salem; Greene was at what is now Greensboro about 20 miles to the east. To reach fords of the upper Dan River that were shallow enough for an army to cross, Greene needed to march north - where Cornwallis expected to intercept and defeat him.

Greene's dragoons, led by Col. Otho Williams and including cavalry commanded by "Lighthorse Henry" Lee, screened his movements successfully. The British were left unclear about the best opportunity to intercept Green as the American army marched northeast, away from Cornwallis.

General Nathanael Greene had his men collect all the boats along the Dan River and successfully ferried all of his army across the river at Irvin's Ferry and Boyd's Ferry. The Americans won the 250-mile "Race to the Dan" between January 18-February 15, 1781 - but by just 12 hours, after strenuous marching by both sides. Most of Greene's men crossed the Dan River at Irvin's Ferry on February 13-14. Lee's Legion crossed at Boyd's Ferry at South Boston, bringing the last of the boats to the north bank.

During the race:8

Camps were not really camps, only stops for a few hours sleep before continuing to march. The van of Cornwallis's forces was often in sight of Williams' rear guard, occasionally exchanging fire. By midnight on February 14 the race had been won by Greene, but by only a few hours.

Nathaniel Greene's army moved northeast, away from Cornwallis, and won the Race to the Dan
Nathaniel Greene's army moved northeast, away from Cornwallis, and won the "Race to the Dan"
Source: National Park Service, An accurate map of North and South Carolina

After gathering more reinforcements and supplies, General Nathanael Greene returned across the Dan River and marched south to fight Cornwallis. As part of that initiative, he tasked Col. Henry "Light-Horse Harry" Lee and General Andrew Pickens to suppress the North Carolina loyalists who might try to join the British.

Two groups of North Carolina loyalists coming to join Cornwallis were destroyed on their journey, one by "friendly fire."

Col. John Pyle was leading 400 loyalists to join Cornwallis on February 25, 1781. When Lee's cavalry encountered Pyle's force, the loyalists thought they were meeting dragoons commanded by Colonel Banastre Tarleton, because Lee's men also wore green jackets.

Lee skillfully took advantage of the confusion. His cavalry mingled with Pyle's loyalists before fighting erupted between them. About 100 completely surprised loyalists were killed in the disastrous "Pyle's Massacre."

On March 4, more than 70 loyalists were marching at night towards the encampment of Cornwallis. Colonel Banastre Tarleton had 100 of his dragoons on patrol. They thought the loyalists were part of Lee's vavalty and attacked them. Reports of the fratricide prevented future recruitment of loyalists:9

These miscarriages so completely broke the spirit of the loyalists in those parts that no party was known afterwards to attempt to join the British in these or adjoining counties.

Cornwallis moved to Hillsborough, North Carolina. After resupply at South Boston, Greene took the Continental Army south across the Dan River. The two armies fought at Guilford Courthouse on March 14, 1781. The battle was technically a British victory because the American army had to retreat from the battlefield, but it was a Pyrrhic victory. The number of British killed/wounded/captured was significant, and the troops lost by Cornwallis were irreplaceable.

After "victory" at Guilford Courthouse, the Cornwallis chose to march east to the North Carolina port city of Wilmington and reached it on April 7. That city was under British control, along with ports at Savannah, Charleston, Portsmouth and New York. General Clinton had no troops to send from New York to Cornwallis, but the Royal Navy brought food, weapons, gunpowder, clothing, and other equipment needed for Cornwallis to fight Virginia and North Carolina militia, supported by some Continental regulars.

Rather than follow the British army east, General Nathanael Greene took his Continental Army south from Guilford Courthouse. His force could not recapture Charles Town, but was large enough to overwhelm every other British outpost outside of the port city.

After resupplying his army at Wilmington, Cornwallis had three choices on where to go.

One option was to march the British Regulars back into the North Carolina Piedmont. Though resupplied, his army was too small to conquer and hold North Carolina. Too few loyalists were willing to fight to retain control over territory. Once the Regulars marched away, most of the people in North Carolina supported the American Revolution. In addition, there was the risk of the British army getting trapped between major rivers and surrounded by a larger force of rebels. Inland, there was no hope of support by the Royal Navy, since the rivers were not navigable except near the Atlantic Ocean.

A second option was to return to South Carolina and enable loyalists to re-establish royal control. General Greene had gone south after Guilford Courthouse and would try to capture Camden. Smaller forces scattered across South Carolina and Georgia were also at risk.

As an indication of his initial planning, Cornwallis notified the British commander in Charles Town that he would bring the British Regulars back to South Carolina if Greene posed a sufficient threat there.

However, Cornwallis also made plans to choose a third option and march north. Three days after reaching Wilmington he sent a message to General William Phillips in Virginia.

He apparently decided on April 23 to go north and join up with Phillips. He gambled that, unlike in North Carolina, there were enough loyalists in South Carolina to retain the territory they already occupied abnd resist Greene's attacks. A march into Virginia could cut off the supply of rebel troops and supplies flowing into the Carolinas and provide all the help needed by loyalists and British troops at Camden, Ninety-Six and Augusta .

Converting into an army of occupation in North Carolina or South Carolina would be a defensive move after British had adopted a southern strategy that required offensive action to gain control over territory. Using the army to defend outposts in the South Carolina "upcountry" would not re-establish royal authority in North Carolina or Virginia, or result in battles that that might enhance the reputations of British officers.

Cornwallis did not desire to return to South Carolina where the brutality of the loyalists and patriots fighting a civil war was appalling. There was little potential for honor in a war of attrition, where the leaders of those who surrendered often were hung by the opposing side rather than kept as prisoners.

By marching north from Wilmington into Virginia, Cornwallis might have the opportunity to fight Continental Army units and Virginia militia in standard battles. Defeating them certainly would cut off the supplies going south. Victories in Virginia might embolden all the loyalists, and potentially leave George Washington isolated with troops around just New York.

The ability of Cornwallis' small army to conquer Virginia and establish a Loyalist government there was thin, but at least he could stay on the offensive there and be supplied near the rivers. After his expected victories, captured territory could be restored to royal government in Virginia - assuming enough Virginia loyalists could be found to retain control and restore civil government.

The British marched out of Wilmington on April 25, 1781. Cornwallis' superior, Sir Henry Clinton in New York, had sent General Benedict Arnold to interrupt supplies headed south. Arnold established a base at Portsmouth and moved up the James River, eventually destroying supplies and public buildings in the new capital of Richmond. General Clinton then sent General William Phillips with additional troops. The objective was to block the movement of supplies, not to reconquer the Virginia colony. Clinton expected to withdraw the British troops from the disruption efforts in Virginia and return them to his army in New York, where he expected the French to coordinate an attack with George Washington.

Cornwallis did not seek permission from Clinton to ignore his orders; he simply notified the Commander-in-Chief as well as General William Phillips that he was moving north into Virginia. Cornwallis did share with Phillips his pessimism regarding the likelihood of either military or political success in Virginia:10

...whether after we have joined we shall have sufficient for a war of conquest I should think very doubtfull. By a war of conquest I mean to possess the country sufficiently to overturn the rebel government and to establish a militia and some kind of mixed authority of our own.

on April 25, 1781, Cornwallis left North Carolina to meet General William Phillips in Petersburg
on April 25, 1781, Cornwallis left North Carolina to meet General William Phillips in Petersburg
Source: Library of Congress, Campagne en Virginie du Major General M'is de LaFayette: ou se trouvent les camps et marches, ainsy que ceux du Lieutenant General Lord Cornwallis en 1781

Had Cornwallis been able to catch up with General Nathanael Greene on the race to the Dan River, the southern strategy might have succeeded. The British capture of Charles Town, the destruction of Continental Army and militia at Waxhaws and Camden had been offset by defeats at Kings Mountain and Cowpens. Had the remains of the Continental Army led by Greene been eliminated, organized resistance might have collapsed.

Had Cornwallis raced a little faster and defeated Greene, he may still have marched into Virginia. Cornwallis might have taken his British army across the colonial border near South Boston, then moved east to Hampton Roads to resupply at Portsmouth rather than at Wilmington, North Carolina. A permanent base could have been established on the Chesapeake Bay, from which British ships could have sailed with raiding parties that would have met minimal opposition in Maryland and Virginia. Troops from Charles Town could have been sent to the Chesapeake Bay base to reconquer Virginia.

If British military success finally appeared inevitable, then loyalists might have become an effective stabilizing force supporting royal governors in southern colonies again. The southern colonies might have been detached from the northern colonies and reintegrated into the British Empire.

Greene won the race to the Dan River when he crossed it on February 15, 1781. Though he recrossed the river and was defeated at Guilford Courthouse on March 15, Cornwallis was so weakened that he chose to march to Wilmington to resupply. When Cornwallis moved north into Virginia, Greene's army became the dominant military force in the Carolinas.

After Guilford Courthouse, Greene marched south to capture the British garrison at Camden. He was defeated again. His army was forced to withdraw after being attacked at Hobkirk Hill on April 15, 1781. However, Greene's forces did cut the supply line to Camden; the British withdrew two weeks after their victory at Hobkirk Hill. Without support from Cornwallis' troops, all the Carolina and Georgia outposts except Charles Town and Savannah were abandoned.11

Like George Washington, General Nathanael Green understood that his priority was to preserve his portion of the Continental Army rather than to win a particular battle. His successful retreat to the Dan River was followed by defeats - but those helped bring an end to the southern strategy and force King George III to agree to agree to a peace treaty.

Cornwallis crossed the Meherrin River at modern-day Emporia on his April, 1781 march to Petersburg
Cornwallis crossed the Meherrin River at modern-day Emporia on his April, 1781 march to Petersburg
Source: Library of Congress, The marches of Lord Cornwallis in the Southern Provinces (by William Faden, 1787)

The Revolutionary War in Virginia

Links

General Cornwallis failed to catch General Greene in the race to the Dan River, then ended up in Yorktown
General Cornwallis failed to catch General Greene in the race to the Dan River, then ended up in Yorktown
Source: United States Military Academy, Major Operation in the South during the Revolutionary War

References

1. "Southern Strategy," Mount Vernon, https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/southern-strategy; Edward J. Cashin, "Revolutionary War in Georgia," New Georgia Encyclopedia, https://www.georgiaencyclopedia.org/articles/history-archaeology/revolutionary-war-in-georgia/; Michael Cecere, Great Things Are Expected From the Virginians, Heritage Books, 2008, p.157, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Great_Things_are_Expected_from_the_Virgi/P9DCwAEACAAJ (last checked March 10, 2026)
2. "Waxhaws - Buford's Massacre," American Battlefield Trust, ; Michael Cecere, Great Things Are Expected From the Virginians, Heritage Books, 2008, p.162, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Great_Things_are_Expected_from_the_Virgi/P9DCwAEACAAJ; "Bounty Land Warrant of Charles Porterfield BLWt1145-450," Southern Campaigns Revolutionary War Pension Statements & Rosters, https://revwarapps.org/blwt1145-450.pdf; "Virginia Regiments in the Continental Army," RevolutionaryWar.us, https://revolutionarywar.us/continental-army/virginia/ (last checked March 10, 2026)
3. Michael Cecere, Great Things Are Expected From the Virginians, Heritage Books, 2008, p.164, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Great_Things_are_Expected_from_the_Virgi/P9DCwAEACAAJ; "Battle of Camden," Mount Vernon, https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/battle-camden (last checked March 7, 2026)
4. "Battle of Camden," Mount Vernon, https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/battle-camden (last checked March 9, 2026)
5. William Caldwell, "Isaac Shelby, Patrick Ferguson, and Fire & Sword: The Power of a Good Story," Journal of the American Revolution, May 28, 2024, https://allthingsliberty.com/2024/05/isaac-shelby-patrick-ferguson-and-fire-sword-the-power-of-a-good-story/ (last checked March 9, 2026)
6. "Kings Mountain," American Battlefield Trust, https://www.battlefields.org/learn/revolutionary-war/battles/kings-mountain; John S. Pancake, This destructive war: the British campaign in the Carolinas, 1780-1782, University of Alabama Press, 1985, p.121, https://archive.org/details/thisdestructivew00panc/page/120/mode/2up; Michael Cecere, Great Things Are Expected From the Virginians, Heritage Books, 2008, p.171, https://www.google.com/books/edition/Great_Things_are_Expected_from_the_Virgi/P9DCwAEACAAJ (last checked March 9, 2026)
7. "'We fight get beat and fight again'," American Battlefield Trust, https://www.battlefields.org/learn/primary-sources/we-fight-get-beat-and-fight-again; "Battle of Cowpens," Mount Vernon, https://www.mountvernon.org/library/digitalhistory/digital-encyclopedia/article/battle-of-cowpens; "The Race to the Dan - January 18th to February 15th, 1781," Carolana, https://www.carolana.com/NC/Revolution/revolution_race_to_the_dan_river_1781.html (last checked March 10, 2026)
8. Bruce L. Petersen, "The Importance of a Small Skirmish During the Race to the Dan," Journal of the American Revolution, September 1, 2021, https://allthingsliberty.com/2021/09/the-importance-of-a-small-skirmish-during-the-race-to-the-dan/; "The Race to the Dan - January 18th to February 15th, 1781," Carolana, https://www.carolana.com/NC/Revolution/revolution_race_to_the_dan_river_1781.html; "The Crossing of the Dan," Halifax County Historical Society, September 5, 2021, https://www.halifaxcountyhistoricalsociety.org/about-the-crossing; Robert Ford, "A Strategist in Waiting: Nathanael Greene at the Catawba River, February 1, 1781," Journal of the American Revolution, January 29, 2026, https://allthingsliberty.com/2026/01/a-strategist-in-waiting-nathanael-greene-at-the-catawba-river-february-1-1781/ (last checked March 9, 2026)
9. "Pyle's Defeat," American Battlefield Trust, https://www.battlefields.org/learn/revolutionary-war/battles/pyles-defeat; "The Battle of Haw River (Pyle's Massacre)," https://revolutionarywar.us/year-1781/battle-haw-river/; Jim Piecuch, "“Light Horse Harry” Lee and Pyle’s Massacre," Journal of the American Revolution, June 19, 2013, https://allthingsliberty.com/2013/06/light-horse-harry-lee-and-pyles-massacre/; "A Daily Dose of the American Rev's Post," March 4, 2026, https://www.facebook.com/share/p/1EMM66muKK/ (last checked March 10, 2026)
10. "Major General William Phillips," Petersburg, Virginia, http://www.petersburgva.gov/484/Major-General-William-Phillips; Ian Saberton, "The Decision That Lost Britain The War: An Enigma Now Resolved," Journal of the American Revolution, January 8, 2019, https://allthingsliberty.com/2019/01/the-decision-that-lost-britain-the-war-an-enigma-now-resolved/; John Ferling, "The Troubled Relationship Between Clinton and Cornwallis and Their 'War' After the War," Journal of the American Revolution, July 15, 2021, https://allthingsliberty.com/2021/07/the-troubled-relationship-between-clinton-and-cornwallis-and-their-war-after-the-war/; "Letter from Charles Cornwallis, Marquis Cornwallis to George Sackville Germain, Viscount Sackville," April 23, 1781, in "Colonial and State Records of North Carolina," Documenting the American South, University of North Carolina, https://docsouth.unc.edu/csr/index.php/document/csr17-0316 (last checked March 10, 2026)
11. "Hobkirk Hill: Second Battle of Camden," American Battlefied Trust, https://www.battlefields.org/learn/revolutionary-war/battles/hobkirk-hill (last checked March 10, 2026)


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